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Sitting between two chairs
Cambodia's dual citizenship debate
Kathryn Poethig1

By the time I arrived in Phnom Penh in 1996, the Second Prime Minister
Hun Sen had called a French Cambodian government official a "dog" and
declared vigorously that those holding two passports were "down-grading
for the nation" (Ker 1996). One month later, Hun Sen's Cambodian
People's Party (CPP) declared single citizenship for government leaders
an official position. During the fracas, I interviewed the Undersecretary
of Foreign Affairs, Marina Pok, a French Cambodian citizen. When asked
about her position on the dual citizenship of government officials, she
queried in French-accented English: "Why should one give up one's dual
nationality? Is it against the interest of the nation? Is it to have a pure
Cambodian nation?" 2 This dual affiliation had become as excruciating as
"sitting between two chairs." My paper focuses on the charged debate in
Phnom Penh regarding the status of dual citizens in the Cambodian government during the 1990s. Through it, I show how the sense of "true"
belonging to the post-war nation diverged between local and transnational
government officials. Those who were against government officials carrying dual citizenship included both CPP members and diaspora Cambodians,
though their arguments differed. Ultimately, the arguments for and against
dual citizenship sought a baseline definition of national identity and a way
to identify those who could signify its center.
That the debate on dual citizenship was possible at all reflected new
global developments regarding multiple citizenships. Dual citizens have
increased worldwide in the last 20 years. 3 A significant increase in this
trend was related to the 1990s "decade of return" as the break-up of the
Soviet Union and its client states sent thousands of refugees who had
resettled in North America, Australia, and Europe, back to homelands
undergoing free market makeovers and a "transition to democracy." The
most controversial dual citizens were those returning to high-level government posts in the countries they had fled. Such rewards of exile transpired
in several new nations in Eastern Europe, but Cambodia's government of
dual citizens was unique in rank and scope. 4 The majority of Cambodian
exiles returned from the US, Canada, Australia, and France, which recognized some form of dual citizenship. For the first five years of the new
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government, more than half of the National Assembly and the top officials of key ministries were dual citizens. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, one
of the co-prime ministers, was a French citizen, and high officials of such
powerful ministries as the Interior, Information, Foreign Affairs, and
Finance were citizens from France, Australia, and the US.
Cambodia's "two-headed government" offered an unusual example of
the impact of diaspora politics on globally monitored "transition to democracies" in the 1990s. The 1991 Paris Peace Agreement stipulated that
Cambodian exiles could return to their homeland to run in the ONmonitored 1993 elections. Cambodian officials of the Vietnamese-backed
State of Cambodia had re-organized as the CPP, and as the sole power
brokers through Vietnam's decade-long occupation, they were markedly
reluctant to relinquish the government to returning exiles. 5 When the
royalist FUNCINPEC party won the largest number of seats in the government, the CPP refused to step down. In order to ease the transition, the
two parties agreed to a "two-headed" solution-two party representatives
for a single position, hence, a First and a Second Prime Minister.
Given the catastrophic Khmer Rouge era and the decade-long Vietnamese occupation that followed in the 1980s, Cambodians everywhere
were concerned with a crisis of national identity (Ebihara et al. 1994).
Indeed, the 1993 Constitutional Convention expressed that one of its "future
tasks" was to "determine who, precisely, are 'THE PEOPLE OF CAMBODIA."' 6 Just who, precisely, the Cambodian people were precipitated a
series of highly charged debates about citizenship in the immigration,
nationality, and electoral laws that were drafted in the first years of the
new democracy. For overseas Cambodians who were returning as dual citizens, the public debate involved their place in the politics of homeland
and host nation. From 1994 to 1996, I interviewed Cambodian refugees
who had returned to Phnom Penh to explore how their multiple political
subjectivities affected their moral discourse of Cambodian citizenship. The
subject of our discussions was a slate of new citizenship laws that were
the first outputs of the new government. What emerged was a peripatetic
morality, investing arguments with a moral authority based on their various identities as refugees, Cambodians, Americans, Christians or Buddhists,
and dual citizens (Poethig 2003). The controversy about government officials with two passports was already circulating among prominent
Cambodian Americans in Phnom Penh in 1995. Cognizant of their own
ambivalent citizenship, their argument for and against dual citizenship
drove to the heart of transnational identity.

Transnational identity and the government debate
Dual citizenship occurs because there is no uniform guidance under international law on the acquisition of citizenship (W eis 1979). 7 It erodes the
basic premises of modern political citizenship as singular and sacred and
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betrays the rhetoric of belonging so primary to the nation state. Anthropologists claim that de-territorialized peoples upset the assumption that
one's identity is fixed to a place or a national culture (Appadurai 1993;
Clifford 1994; Hannerz 1996), indicating instead that transnational cultures
are formed through multi-stranded social relations between homelands and
settlement (Glick Schiller et al. 1995). The identities of those who shuttle
across borders are thus hybrid, their allegiances multiple. Cambodians
in diaspora uniquely embody this fractured legal, political, and cultural
status when they return to Cambodia. Cambodians who became American
citizens, for example, chose to retain their original citizenship when they
learned that US rulings were amenable to dual citizenship. One could
possess two passports as long as the dual citizen produced the US passport
upon entry to US territories. At the time, there was, however, considerable confusion around citizenship laws in Cambodia as both immigration
and nationality laws were being redrafted. Upon their return, these former
refugees often used their US, Australian, or French passport to enter
Cambodia and were thus treated as aliens requiring residency visas.
The debate on the dual citizenship of government officials pitted the
CPP as the opposition party against FUNCINPEC and other less visible
exiled parties. For CPP officials, dual citizenship contradicted their notion
of a nation of cultural purity based on stationary Khmerness. They argued
that returning Cambodians' cultural hybridity meant that they were not
true Khmer. Furthermore, dual citizens would not be able to adjudicate
conflicts of interest between the nations in which they held membership.
The argument here turned around the terms "Khmer Angkor" and
"anikachun." "True Cambodians" and authentic members of the nation
are Khmer Angkor, signified by an ancient glorious era in Cambodian
history. Returning Cambodians are called anikachun. In some cases, they
are also referred to as "anikachun chochuh," a derogatory term. Originally,
anikachun or anikajan referred to citizens of a country living abroad or
resident aliens, and commonly designated settler Chinese and Vietnamese
in Cambodia (who are now called antaopriive or immigrant). Those I
interviewed felt that even a neutral reference to overseas Cambodians as
anikachun was an unwanted affiliation since settler Vietnamese have long
been a pariah group due to the anxiety Cambodians felt towards a history
of Vietnam's aggression. 8 To be anikachun or, worse, anikachun chochuh
thus implied that overseas Cambodians had not only lost the Khmer "soul"
in exile but were allied by association with the historic enemy of the
motherland. They thus returned as the inassimilable "other." Although
they too had fled the country during the Khmer Rouge era, the CPP claimed
identity as Khmer Angkor and counterpoised it to anikachun. Given this
distinction, dual-citizen government officials redefined national purity,
loyalty, and commitment. They claimed a more hybrid national community,
argued that even single citizens could have mixed loyalties, and celebrated
the benefits of dual consciousness in the international sphere.
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Prime Minister Hun Sen's case against dual citizens:
noodles or rice gruel
By early 1996, a controversial clause in the pending Nationality Law requiring single nationality for senior government officials revealed the widening
gap between the CPP and FUNCINPEC. As the Electoral Law was still in
draft form and both commune and national elections were looming, there
was intense pressure to establish the role of dual citizens in the government in the Nationality Law. 9 Bou Thang, chair of the CPP Commission
handling the draft of the Nationality Law, questioned dual citizens' ability
to be "[loyal] to the country" (Heng and Seng 1996). In a series of public
attacks, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen urged FUNCINPEC officials to
"give up [their] extra nationality now or [they] will have no right to run
in the elections" (Hun Sen 1996a; see also Barber 1996). By June, the CPP
Central Committee Plenum issued a statement to "support the principle of
one nationality of political leaders" (Cambodian People's Party 1996).
Prime Minister Hun Sen and other CPP officials argued that expatriate government officials were a liability to the nation for two reasons. First, anyone
holding two passports lacked a "single-hearted" nationalism and would
endanger national security because of their conflicting allegiances. Second,
as returning refugees, these officials were "fair-weather" citizens who were
no longer truly Khmer and would be unable to endure the necessary hardship of a poor struggling country. He juxtaposed this with his own party's
status as Khmer Angkor, aligned with the common folk.
In the first case, the Second Prime Minister noted that he had initially
rejected the idea of dual citizenship for government officials when it had
been raised at the 1991 Paris negotiations. But afterward, he had reluctantly agreed to a grace period:
It did not seem to be appropriate for some of the brothers to make

the minimal sacrifice of relinquishing their foreign nationality because
there was then no real stability, no assurances that our country would
have the necessary peace to hold elections. Forcing them to relinquish
their foreign nationality seemed to be too cruel.
(Hun Sen 1996a)
With a second national election in 1998 looming, the grace period for the
forced collaboration of CPP and FUNCINPEC was over. Prime Minister
Hun Sen and his party instigated a call for this "minimal sacrifice." If the
loss of a second citizenship was "too cruel," its sacrifice would indicate
intent to place Cambodia before all other interests. Claiming the better
part of nationalism, he caricatured officials with dual citizenship as the
nation's bigamists: 10
When one wife is angry with him, he runs to the embrace of the other
wife. He steals things from one place and keeps them in the other
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place ... [P]oliticians should have only one nationality in order to be
fully responsible to the nation and to maintain equity between two
nationalities.
(Hun Sen 1996b)
But a pledge of unaligned allegiance was difficult for either party to claim.
As CPP officials had risen to power during the Vietnamese occupation
and FUNCINPEC officials returned from nations that had funded the
anti-Communist resistance, all Cambodian officials were highly sensitive
about any compromise of Cambodian sovereignty. Attacked by his opponents as a "Vietnamese puppet," Hun Sen's own allegiance had been
questioned. Earlier in 1996, FUNCINPEC officials had opposed the celebration of January 7 as an official Cambodian holiday established by the
Vietnamese to commemorate their rout of the Khmer Rouge in 1979. Both
parties had to relinquish foreign patronage to gain legitimate claim to the
nation.
In his second point, Hun Sen played on a perceived moral weakness of
dual citizens who were formerly refugees. His argument challenged the
political category of refugee identity itself as the modern icon of victimization and statelessness. He intimated that the burden of suffering was
borne not by those who fled, the common refugee plight, but by those who
remained. Refugees had chosen self-preservation over duty. Statelessness
was thus reconfigured as voluntarism and abandonment. This abandonment
had not been punished but rewarded by multiple privileges, one of which
was a second nationality. The only way to recover trust was to lose something again-the second passport. This argument negated not only the
efficacy but the authenticity of "fax nationalisms" (Anderson 1992) against
local nationalisms. When Cambodians fled their homeland they betrayed
their patriotism so fundamentally that they should not be trusted with its
renewed expression in better times. The efforts of exiled Cambodians scattered through France, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, and the US who
lobbied for Cambodia's reconstruction were lost on a populace for whom
transnational citizens were fair-weather cousins. They arrived during the
good times; they would leave during the bad times.
Furthermore, these returning refugees who had lived in luxury while
others suffered did not "know what Khmer Angkor are, what really poor
people, people in difficulty are." They were not able to eat "only morning
glory and fish paste" (Hun Sen l996c). Alluding to starvation conditions
under the Khmer Rouge, he remonstrated:
If we eat grass, rice gruel or noodles, let us eat them together. We
should share weal or woe with each other. It is not desirable to have
leaders who join in only when it is time to eat good things, such as noodles, and who quickly run away when people are forced to eat rice gruel.
(Hun Sen 1996a)
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In short, Khmer Angkor had not fled the country in hard times and would
share in the country's suffering. Returning refugees' weak nationalism
could not compare with the nationalism of leaders who, in local parlance,
had "gone through the blood."
This rhetoric, however, obscured the fact that many CPP officials who
were formerly Khmer Rouge (including Hun Sen) deserted their posts and
fled to Vietnam early in Pol Pot's genocidal regime. When they returned
with the Vietnamese troops in 1979, most were installed in the Vietnamesebacked socialist government. As most Cambodian refugees fled at the fall
of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, it is ironic that Hun Sen claims a
share in the suffering of Cambodians-presumably under their own decadelong administration under Vietnam. It is thus striking that Hun Sen
characterizes refugee flight as a choice of self-preservation over duty, a
choice made by members of his own party.
But the CPP challenge to the legitimacy of refugee flight played upon
a deep ambivalence towards refugees in the general population. No doubt,
a good measure of populist envy also entered into this calculation. Officials
of the Lon Nol regime who left Cambodia before 1975 were the primary
targets of disdain. Those who survived the Khmer Rouge years might
inspire the empathy of fellow survivors, but their departure at the point
of critical reconstruction at the installation of the Vietnamese-backed
People's Republic of Kampuchea was also a betrayal. The link between
postcolonial refugee statelessness and colonial affiliations demystified
refugee identity. The deposed elite often sought refugee status in the
nations that had supported them. If as refugees, Cambodia's elite turned
their early French and US contacts into resettlement sites, returning with
the mantle of Metropole citizenship and often under their financial backing,
how could their claim to Cambodian nationalism escape suspicion?
Dual citizens had given away the country, and their plea for the hybrid
identity of officials could further destabilize the government, claimed Hun
Sen (Hun Sen 1996a). If the two parties were wrestling for the meat of
the nation, the Second Prime Minister charged that the "foreign" dog
(chhkae sot) had its jaws on the leg of the government. If dual citizens
could run for office, then Vietnamese and Chinese, also anikachun, could
take advantage of such an opportunity, producing a "Cambodian parliament and government ... full of half-blood foreigners" (Hun Sen 1996a).
Hun Sen's diatribe against "half-blood foreigners" in the government
percolated on the diaspora Cambodian internet as the debate raged in
Phnom Penh. It traveled between a listserve and a newsgroup when I initiated a discussion on the matter from May 9 to May 14, 1996. As many
overseas Cambodians were subscribers to both groups, the responses shuttled between them. While there was general assent that Hun Sen's move
was a crass ploy to destabilize FUNCINPEC, and that Hun Sen's loyalties were split between Cambodia and Vietnam, the morality of multiple
citizenships for officials was vigorously debated. A minority argued that
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government officials could hold two passports; some proposed it as a
temporary measure to encourage more highly skilled "Khmer expats" to
return; most agreed that government officials should give up their second
passport to show a commitment to building a Cambodian state. After all,
one noted, "[Hun Sen] did not say that expatriates cannot hold high
offices-just that they are not dual citizens" (online posting by psuOOOO@
odin.cc.pdx.edu 1996). Many subscribers condemned the corruption and
moral turpitude of FUNCINPEC and other exiles. The general sentiment
of the group was that it was "time to test the seriousness and honest
integrity of Cambodian politicians ... If ones [sic] do not have courage
and principles to fight for Cambodia, they should have no damn business
in the decision-making that affects the destiny and lives of Cambodian
people" (online posting by psuOOOO@odin.cc.pdx.edu 1996).

Anikachun nationalism
For Anderson ( 1991 ), national identity is an ideological process in which
a political community "thinks" their nation into being; the nation is an
imagined community. Such communities are made up of citizens who
espouse a "deep horizontal comradeship." In an era of transnational linkages and flexible citizenships, Cambodian returnees asserted the virtue of
multiple "comradeships" and the dangers of an ethnic basis for nationality. Impatient with their discursive and political marginalization as
anikachun, dual citizens in Cambodia did not take the quest for a singlehearted nationalism as seriously as their diasporic kin or local Cambodians.
Hun Sen's claim that leadership required an originary Khmerness led one
Cambodian American to remark confidentially:
All of our leaders came from elsewhere and were supported by them.
If you see Sihanouk, supported by French, if you see Lon No!,
supported by who-you-know [sic]. If you see Pol Pot, he was in France
and supported by China; Hun Sen, Vietnam. It's coming back to
French again, French and Vietnamese ... and American.
While First Prime Minister Ranariddh kept silent, other dual citizens in
office argued that their dual nationality did not jeopardize the state but in
fact augmented it (Heng and Seng 1996; Ker 1996). They stressed that they
had sacrificed productive lives in the West to return and contribute to
Cambodia's reconstruction (Cambodia Times 1996). Other transnational
Cambodian officials stressed the usefulness of their dual national identities.
Ahmad Yahya, representing Cham Muslims in the National Assembly,
asserted that he would maintain his American citizenship if he had to give
up one passport because "nationality is not important. What is important is
patriotism" (Cambodia Times 1996 ). His claim to Cham ethnicity and advocacy for their rights already disrupted the implied ethnic Khmerness of"true
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Cambodian" patriots, and his American passport pressed this point further.
His particular form of patriotism reflected the flexible interpretation of
"nationality" held by most formerly exiled Cambodian officials. In our
meeting, he noted that if his colleagues came from the US, they were "proUS, if they came from France, they're pro-France, Australia, pro-Australia."
But unlike their Cambodian communist counterparts, they shared the "same
mentality" about democracy, human rights, and rule of law.
When queried on their "flightiness," dual citizens in Phnom Penh were
often quite curt. One Cambodian American woman remarked dryly,
"Cambodian people here, I've heard it many times, they think that once
something happens, we're going to fly away, leave them." This argument
against refugee flight indicted all returning Cambodians, though its implication for government officials held the most weight. Various Cambodian
Americans stated that if such a political crisis would emerge, money and
political power would trump a second passport. A Cambodian American in
Phnom Penh stated a simple truth: "The people with the money will leave;
the poor will stay." As for the claim that returning Cambodians had more
wealth to protect, the same man admitted that many FUNCINPEC officials
were certainly corrupt, but added that many former classmates who had
never left Cambodia were now much wealthier than he was. However,
in the summer of 1997, a brief but violent power struggle between CPP
and FUNCINPEC did prove the efficacy of the claims about returning
Cambodians. Many former exiles fled to Bangkok or further abroad, and
among them First Prime Minister, Prince Ranariddh. 11 But in 1996, FUNCINPEC officials still claimed sure-footedness, and noted that the CPP's reference to their fleet-footedness hid the hope that FUNCINPEC officials
would abandon the government to its former proprietors in a time of duress.
Espousing a diaspora nationalism, returning Cambodians argued that
their "flightiness" freed them to "speak out the truth" away from the locus
of repressive power. Cambodians in diaspora-like those on the internetwere aware of their impact on the Cambodian state. The Cambodian nation
was now scattered around the globe and the Cambodian state had to
contend with its de-territorialized constituency. Officials of the CPP, once
isolated from international scrutiny, now found themselves answerable to
influential donor nations, the United Nations, the international development community, and 300,000 Cambodians in diaspora. If the CPP
appealed to local Cambodians by declaring the moral authority of a single
nationality, they had also to address the complaints of the transnational
Cambodian lobbyists who took national politics onto the streets and into
the legislative halls of other cities. Hun Sen's challenge to FUNCINPEC
officials' dual citizenship included an admonishment to Cambodians
demonstrating in France (Hun Sen 1996a). Those whose "feet are planted
in two countries" did not know the lived realities of Cambodia. He asked:
"do they know the conditions of democracy in the countryside?" Until
they were able to leap over canals with him in the countryside, "it is not
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right to hurl insults at each other in Paris, Belgium, Washington or Phnom
Penh" (Hun Sen 1996a). Frustrated by his inability to restrain diaspora
dissent, he warned against demonstrations within his reach: "Be careful!
I will act. I will use military force to deal with you" (Hun Sen 1996a).
This threat to suppress opposition was a good reason to support the
dual citizenship of officials, noted a Cambodian American on the internet:
It is already sad enough that people must exile out of the country in
order to speak out the truth on the current situation inside Cambodia
... The very least we can do is to extend our moral support for politicians that risk their lives by trying to bring changes to Cambodia.
(Thean 1996)

Between two chairs: what is true loyalty?
If Ahmad Yahya was not a "true Cambodian," Marina Pok, Undersecretary
of Foreign Affairs, was neither "true" nor "pure" Cambodian. She was
the daughter of a French Cambodian mother and Cambodian father; her
family had escaped to France before the Khmer Rouge arrived in Phnom
Penh. As a recipient of "dual cultures" as well as dual nationalities, she
vigorously rejected the pressure to relinquish either. During my interview
with her, she asked, "Is it against the interest of the nation? Is it to have
a pure Cambodian nation?" She demolished the conflation of nation and
ethnic purity at the heart of Hun Sen's diatribe by arguing that neither
true nor pure local Cambodians exist. The ideology of a pure Khmer
ethnicity was a dangerous legacy in Cambodia that had inspired both
General Lon Nol's racist nationalism and the Khmer Rouge policy of
extermination. Furthermore, if pre-war Cambodian society was the benchmark for cultural authenticity, it was, as another Cambodian American
put it, "deep under the sea."
Marina Pok then struck at the heart of Prime Minister Hun Sen's charge
that those like her were not Khmer Angkor-stationary Khmers who represented the heart of Cambodia. "Are Khmer nationals better citizens?" she
asked, "Is their allegiance more certain?" Arguing that historical experience affects morality more than legal affiliation to a second state, she
remarked that those who survived the Khmer Rouge period and subsequent regimes "had to betray their neighbor, to kill their neighbor in order
to survive." Their "values," she noted cautiously, were "very ... diverted."
Then she added:
Being a returnee, I need to have a relationship with my colleagues,
and loyalty is a basic part of the relationship of work. It's very difficult, because these people today need me because I am in a strong
position. But tomorrow, they will just turn back and follow somebody
else who is in a stronger position to serve their interests. And these
are people who have one nationality.
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Loyalty, concluded Undersecretary Pok, was a trait that did not sit well
with pragmatists; personal affairs often trump national interests. The
number of passports cannot measure loyalty and national diplomacy.
If, according to Undersecretary Pok, neither ethnic purity nor possessing a single passport has any claim on national loyalties, does dual affiliation
affect the course of national diplomacy? As Pok was Undersecretary of
Foreign Affairs and the liaison to ASEAN, the highly regarded regional
affiliation of Southeast Asian nations, her dual associations did have multiple effects. She offered three examples. In the first case, she referred to
her participation in the negotiation between an "Asian" state and "Western"
pressure for Cambodia to adhere to human rights standards. The weight of
her "heritage of Western education" predisposed her to the human rights
agenda more readily than her ASEAN colleagues. In domestic affairs, however, she took an "Asian" interpretation of rights concerned with economic
development over civil rights. If in the human rights argument she identified an Asia-West binary cultural position, her status as an official of an
"underdeveloped" post-socialist country set her at the bottom rung of Asia's
aggressive modernity. She related in a second example how she was dismissed by a Western official as an unrealistic diplomat from an "emerging
country." She felt the sting as a Cambodian subjected to the disdain of
those with whom she shared, in other circles, similar cultural capital.
The bargaining tables of both ASEAN neighbors and Western donors,
she suggested, were minefields that one must maneuver. Neither local nor
transnational Cambodians evaded the humiliations, but for those whose
identities were doubly ambivalent, the consciousness of being associated
with both was more acute. Thus Marina Pok related this final tale of
Fanon-like epiphany of collapsed consciousness. In a conversation with a
French colleague about an upcoming trip to Thailand for a meeting with
private investors, they discussed what clothes they would bring:
"Are you going to bring a national dress?" my friend asked. And I
said "Yeah, I am." And she said, "It would look so ridiculous ...
because investors want to see the modern. Thai women active in Thai
society do not wear Thai national dress anymore ... You would look
like [you were wearing a] boubou" (you know, African women in
France who are dressed in the bright African dress). I never thought
that if I go to a meeting wearing a Cambodian national dress, it would
look like a boubou!
To be signified by a boubou, then, is to be identified as an inassimilable
postcolonial immigrant in the Metropole. Which mask does she wear?
Marina Pok was neither a French Cambodian wearing a boubou nor a
Khmer Angkor stateswoman. Seven Cambodian women were elected into
office, and in official photos they posed in "Cambodian national dress."
She related the message that dual citizens know so well-as citizens of
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several countries, they are native to none. ln their second homes, they are
hyphenated; in their first home, they are anikachun.
But it is also an argument made in my presence to indicate that as an
official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Undersecretary Pok was cultivating a sophisticated national identity to accommodate Asia's high
modernity. Given the contentious transition in the following year, when
many FUNCINPEC officials were expelled, Pok's inference is important
because it stresses that dual citizens could be critical to maneuver
Cambodia's transition into a new global polity. This was because, she
argued, dual citizens were adept at the reflexive manners of modernity,
and able to market Angkor's vestigial glory while interpreting Cambodia's
particular democratic polity to humanitarian donors.

Conclusion
The issue of dual citizenship that arose during debates on the Law on
Nationality in 1996 was, in some ways, a politics of dissimulation on both
sides. On the one hand, it was staged as a vociferous campaign by officials of the former regime who invoked a nation of cultural purity based
on stationary Khmerness, a status few could authentically claim in twenty
years of massive displacement, occupation, and civil war. Returning
Cambodians were characterized as morally compromised because they had
been self-serving as refugees, and thus unreliable; they were now anikachun
and thus not fully members of the nation; and finally, their dual allegiance
was dangerous for a fragile democracy. As both parties were the subject
of proxy politics, these claims might have been dismissed were it not that
they exploited a deep-seated anxiety about Cambodia's political stability
and general desire for a clear national identity.
The dual citizens in government with whom I spoke articulated a moral
discourse of dual commitments that resolved for them the dilemmas posed
by local officials and their diaspora compatriots. They first rejected the
discursive distinction between anikachun and true or pure Khmer. Because
their "purity" had been questioned, disapora Cambodians depicted purity
itself as a ploy to keep them outside the nation. In its place they argued
for a heterogeneous body of peoples as Cambodia's future. Plurality in
Cambodia's home space re-narrated the meaning of membership to include
its transnational citizens in diaspora communities around the world. Their
defense of refugee "flightiness" was less articulate and proved to be
prophetic during the 1997 coup when many FUNCINPEC officials fled
the conflict. Their claim to patriotic altruism by returning from lucrative
salaries to assist with Cambodia's reconstruction belied the popular perception that returning Cambodian officials were as corrupt and greedy as their
local counterparts.
Because singular national identity was held as a standard for government service, dual citizens challenged the sacred character of this
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singularity. Their strategies sometimes slipped across the hyphen, asserting
Cambodian patriotism while claiming US interests. As far as allegiance
was concerned, dual citizens in Phnom Penh contested the inviolability of
Khmer Angkor loyalty. Pok's responses represented a general sentiment
among returning Cambodians. If refugees were held suspect for fleeing,
those who stayed survived by morally questionable means. Pragmatism
often trumped the higher principles of loyalty in difficult times, and no
one was above reproach. Rather than a detriment, dual consciousness could
facilitate Cambodia's re-entry into the complex, sophisticated dynamics
of international affairs.
How does transnational identity affect this moral discourse? The study
of the moral reasoning of Cambodian Americans suggests a strategy for
inclusion that employs all subject positions available to them. If they spoke
as Cambodians to the media, and dual citizens in the Assembly, others
adjusted in my presence to identify as US citizens. But this identification
with two nations is not co-equal, or a slippery status that one can shift
into--and out of-easily. It is played along various vectors of power.
Claiming the West offers one a taste of positional superiority when
returning "home," it is also a painful reminder of one's secondary status
among those with whom one shares the more privileged passport. Claiming
to be Cambodian ranks one as third class in the global hierarchy of nations,
and with "locals" one is dismissed by the exclusionary tactics of nationalist and ressentiment politics. This hybrid positionality redefined such
politically charged words as national purity, loyalty, and commitment
during Cambodia's reconstruction in the mid-1990s. This was, perhaps,
for those engaged in the struggle, as difficult as sitting in a space between
two chairs.

Notes

2
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Fieldwork for this paper was partially funded by the Social Science Research
Council. I wish to acknowledge the two editors, Leakthina Oilier and Tim Winter
for their support and careful editing. I am indebted to Leakthina Oilier for her
assistance on the linguistic analysis of anikachun identity. Khatharya Urn, Aihwa
Ong, Claire Fisher, Marty Stortz, and Jane Margold also offered feedback on
an earlier draft of this paper.
All material quoted without a source in this chapter is from personal interviews
with the author conducted in Cambodia in 1996.
South America and the Caribbean have had various dual citizen treaties for
many years (Jones-Correa 2003). Asian countries where labor migration and
immigration are high are also following suit. Among these countries are
Cambodia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and most recently, India
and the Philippines (see Renshon 2001).
Included here are Milan Panic who was offered the post of prime minister in
Serbia in 1992, and Mohammad Sacirby who was offered the post of Bosnian
ambassador to the United Nations. Rein Taagepera ran unsuccessfully for president of Estonia, and Canadian citizen Stanislaw Tyminski ran against Lech
Walesa for president of Poland (Anderson 1994).
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5 Initially named People's Republic of Kampuchea under the Vietnamese occupation, the government changed its name to the State of Cambodia on April 30,
1989 as Vietnam withdrew.
6 The Cambodian Constitution, www.constitution.org/cons/cambodia.htm.
7 Dual citizenship and dual nationality are often used interchangeably though they
differ slightly. Bar Yaacov (1961) identifies five ways to acquire a dual citizenship: naturalization, through the naturalization of one's own parents;
acquisition through marriage; military service in a second state without loss of
earlier citizenship; as an illegitimate child born in one country after which the
foreign-born father is identified; and finally, return to the country of origin and
reactivating former citizenship.
8 Vietnam was Sino-Confucian, and its attitude towards its "barbarian" neighbors
included a civilizing mission that in the mid-1800s involved a "Vietnamization"
of language, dress, and administration (Chandler 1993a: 123ff.). Additionally,
its colonizing strategy involved replacing Cambodian peasants with Vietnamese
settlers. This slow appropriation of Cambodian territory and Cambodia's perception of Vietnam's ethnocentrism is a large contributor to the long-standing hatred
and fear of the Vietnamese expressed by generations of Cambodians.
9 It finally became evident that dual citizenship was not the domain of the Law
on Nationality but the Electoral Law. Though the former determined who would
be eligible as citizens to vote, the Electoral Law would identify which citizens
could be candidates. The Law on Nationality, passed in October 1996, supported
dual citizenship, and the Electoral Law, passed in December 1997, did not bar
dual citizens from office.
I 0 Geyer ( 1996) also uses the metaphor of bigamy when arguing against American
dual citizenship.
II Donovan ( 1998) argues that the coup de force by Hun Sen revealed his understanding and use of political theater over written law. Ranariddh, a law professor
in France, and other exiles were schooled in legal culture of the Western liberal
tradition that relied on the force of written law. Hun Sen employed the more
ritualized features of the "theater state" of Indic Southeast Asia. Hun Sen could
have legally unseated Ranariddh when it was discovered that he illegally
imported arms, with further dealings in arms from the Khmer Rouge. Instead,
because he controlled the military, Hun Sen sent troops to encircle Phnom Penh.
In the meantime, Ranariddh fled the country and was replaced as First Prime
Minister by Ung Rout, an Australian citizen. On July 5 fighting broke out
between the two forces in Phnom Penh. By the end of the following day, Hun
Sen was victorious. Thus instead of using law, Hun Sen employed the armed
forces and political theater to establish his sole legitimacy for political leadership.

